A member of the M23 armed group walk alongside residents through a street of the Keshero neighborhood in Goma, on January 27, 2025. Since their deployment, several peacekeepers from SAMIDRC have been killed or injured by hostile armed groups in the unstable eastern DRC. These casualties have been linked partially to SAMIDRC’s insufficient logistics and equipment, says the writer. Picture: STR / AFP
Dr. Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa
PLANS are underway to construct a military logistics hub for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) aimed at enhancing the operational readiness and effectiveness of the regional Standby Force.
On December 13, 2024, Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa, the current SADC chairperson, officially launched the construction of the SADC Standby Force’s regional logistics depot in Botswana. This strategic logistics depot is projected to be fully operational by 2030, according to SADC Executive Secretary Elias Magosi. For SADC, the capacity to swiftly deploy and sustain peace support operations in the region’s conflict areas hinges on having sufficient military stocks and comprehensive logistical support—encompassing storage, maintenance, repairs, and medical supplies. This hub should provide SADC with the support it needs to better respond to crises in the region.
The SADC Standby Force was officially launched in 2007 and declared fully operational in 2016. It is one of the five regional brigade-sized standby forces in east, west, central, north, and southern Africa, constituting the African Union (AU) African Standby Force (ASF). Thus, the SADC Standby Force is a collective, multidimensional capability for peace support operations comprising military, police, and civilian components. These personnel are stationed in their home countries and are ready for rapid deployment in alignment with the ASF concept.
The ASF is one of the key components of the African Peace and Security Architecture, which also includes the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), among other bodies tasked with addressing peace and security threats within the AU. Specifically, the ASF was established as a mechanism to enable the PSC to deploy peace support operations or undertake enforcement interventions in alignment with Articles 4(h) and (j) of the AU Constitutive Act. The interventions are permissible in cases of unconstitutional changes of governments, egregious human rights abuses and genocide, and conflicts that threaten regional stability.
The original ASF’s policy framework envisaged that the PSC, the principal body responsible for continental peace and security, would be the primary body tasked with mandating the deployment of peace operations. However, in practice, many of the continent’s peace operations have been initiated by the AU’s regional economic communities and regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs) or by groups of member states that formed a coalition of the willing.
For example, the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government, the regional body’s supreme decision-making body, deployed missions to Mozambique (SAMIM) in 2021 and to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (SAMIDRC) in 2024. SADC deployed these missions, purportedly under the ASF framework, to assist the respective governments in quelling an insurgency in northern Mozambique and restoring peace and security in eastern DRC. However, the PSC only endorsed the deployments post-facto. While this provided the SADC missions with crucial political credibility and access to AU financial and logistical support, it reinforced the need to finalize the ASF Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and RECs/RMs regarding the decision-making and mandating process.
Although the deployments of SAMIM and SAMIDRC unequivocally demonstrated the political will and commitment of SADC member states to collective conflict management, they also exposed critical gaps: the region’s lack of a logistics depot for the SADC Standby Force and the continent’s lack of airlift capability. The absence of a regional logistics depot led to significant logistical challenges and vulnerabilities that undermined the SADC missions’ ability to effectively implement their mandates.
While the AU already has a Continental Logistics Base in Douala, Cameroon, it proved challenging to transfer equipment from this base to the SADC missions because very few African countries have strategic airlift capabilities. For instance, in 2022 the PSC expressed concern regarding the logistical and financial challenges that hindered SAMIM from effectively fulfilling its mandate. To support SAMIM, the AU contributed equipment from its Continental Logistics Base. However, the PSC had to appeal to a few African countries with strategic airlift capabilities to assist in transporting the donated equipment to Mozambique. Delays in transportation exacerbated SAMIM’s perpetual shortfalls in logistics and equipment as some SADC member were slow to meet their commitments.
Similarly, SAMIDRC faced limitations in implementing its mandate due to a lack of necessary logistical assets and capabilities despite AU support. The PSC, for instance, reportedly ensured SAMIDRC received a publicly unspecified allocation from the $7 million disbursement from the AU Peace Fund Crisis Reserve Facility in 2024. However, the mission experienced delays in receiving equipment from the Continental Logistics Base due to AU and SADC airlift constraints.
These logistical limitations put at risk not only the mandates of these SADC missions but also the safety and security of African peacekeepers. Since their deployment, several peacekeepers from SAMIDRC have been killed or injured by hostile armed groups in the unstable eastern DRC. These casualties have been linked partially to SAMIDRC’s insufficient logistics and equipment.
SAMIDRC’s logistical constraints also spotlight the need to strengthen the SADC-AU-UN strategic relationship on peacekeeping. SAMIDRC operates alongside long-standing UN peacekeeping operations in the DRC (MONUSCO) that has considerably greater logistical capabilities. After some deliberation, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2746 in 2024, authorizing MONUSCO to assist SAMIDRC through improved coordination, information sharing, and technical and logistical backing. Consequently, MONUSCO has provided SAMIDRC limited logistical and operational support, including transportation of senior officials, military defence walls and storage containers, and a loaned armoured vehicle.
The construction and operationalization of the regional depot is thus urgently needed to address SADC’s logistical challenges. The depot would facilitate a “just-in-time” logistics system, ensuring that prepositioned stocks are delivered precisely when and where they are needed. As stated by Magosi, SADC’s executive secretary, “Once completed the depot will provide a central platform for logistics support to the Standby Force and thus eliminate delays in logistical support to enhance the ability of the SADC Standby Force to effectively and successfully conduct peace support missions.” This will enhance the readiness and robust operational and logistical capacity of the SADC Standby Force and help avoid deploying troops in harm’s way.
A challenge is that SADC has raised only $15 million of the approximately $45 million needed to complete the logistics depot. As a result, the regional organization has appealed to international partners, including the AU and UN, to come to its aid to bolster its efforts to support global peace and security. However, relying excessively on external donors for such a strategic logistical framework for regional security could be unsustainable in the long run. To effectively tackle these issues, SADC needs to redouble its efforts to self-finance the facility. The principle of “he who pays the piper calls the tune” underscores that SADC member states must take greater responsibility for ensuring adequate, predictable, and sustainable funding for vital regional strategic projects.
In addition, SADC should consistently conduct logistics exercises for collective regional peace support operations, such as the Standby Force’s Logistics Training Exercise, dubbed “Exercise NGUIZANI,” which took place in Luanda, Angola, in 2023. The regional bloc previously staged several field training exercises instrumental to developing the continental African Standby Force, such as AMANI Africa I and II, during the 2010s.
These exercises are not just routine; they are essential in demonstrating SADC’s unwavering commitment to strengthening the operational readiness of the African Standby Force. With enhanced preparedness, SADC can rapidly deploy to effectively address crises in the region and beyond.
Dr. Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa is a senior faculty member of Africa University and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Pan African Thought and Conversation (IPATC), University of Johannesburg. The opinions and thoughts expressed in this piece are the author’s only and don’t reflect the views of affiliated institutions.
* Dr. Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa is a senior faculty member of Africa University and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Pan African Thought and Conversation (IPATC), University of Johannesburg. The opinions and thoughts expressed in this piece are the author’s only and don’t reflect the views of affiliated institutions.
** This article was originally published on https://theglobalobservatory.org/
*** The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of The African