Congolese army soldiers walk along the side of the Bulengo camp a few kilometres from the centre of Goma, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, on February 16, 2024. - The conflict between M23 rebels and government forces has intensified in Masisi territory causing many displaced people to move around Goma without shelter or food, leaving everything behind. Photo by Guerchom Ndebo / AFP
Tony Ademiluyi
The M23 was formed on 4 April 2012 when nearly three hundred soldiers—most of them former members of the National Congress of the Defence of the People (CNDP)—turned against the Democratic Republic of Congo government, citing poor conditions in the army and the government’s unwillingness to implement the 23 March 2009 peace deal.
Its leader is General Sultani Makenga.
The M23 claims to defend the interests of the Congolese Tutsi and Kinyarwanda-speaking minorities, asserting they are under severe threat from Hutu militias and denouncing the DRC's inability to protect them.
However, the M23 has perpetrated human rights violations among civilians, including Tutsis, when it occupied the provincial capital of Goma, North Kivu, in 2012.
It took the joint action of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) and the United Nations to defeat them in 2013, causing many combatants to flee to Uganda and Rwanda.
Following its defeat, the M23 lied low until March 2022, when they shot down a UN helicopter, killing six UN troops.
They expanded their grip by taking hold of the Rutshuru territory, raiding the Rumangabo military base in May 2022, and capturing the Bunagana border town in June 2022.
The attack on the Rumangabo military base provided the rebel group with access to military weapons, while the capture of Bunagana increased its revenue base through illegal taxation of border trade. In late November 2022, the M23 also captured Kibumba and Buhumba in Rutshuru territory, cutting off Route National 2, a major access road to Goma.
Some rival rebel groups concluded a non-aggression pact during an informal meeting in May 2022 in Pinga, North Kivu.
Patriotic motives certainly played a role in the pact, as many view the M23 as a foreign proxy. The FARDC was also seeking unusual allies in their fight against the M23. A UN midterm report showed how the FARDC supplied weapons and ammunition to, and engaged in combat with, various non-state armed groups.
Human Rights Watch condemned this practice, stating the DRC government was in cahoots with groups involved in severe human rights violations. In the end, DRC President Felix Tshisekedi denounced the FARDC and reshuffled the army commanders in North Kivu on 6 July 2022.
However, evidence still showed a collaboration between the FARDC and a rebel group known as Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR).
What distinguishes the M23 from other armed groups is its impact on the fragile power balance in the African Great Lakes region.
From a Rwandan perspective, the M23’s support of Congolese Tutsis and its fight with the Rwandan rebel group FDLR results in some aligned interests.
According to President Kagame, dismantling the FDLR is a security priority. He was quoted as saying: “But when anyone crosses a red line, we don’t ask anybody for permission to intervene. We simply move in and sort the problem out.”
The UN midterm report indicted Rwanda, stating the Rwandan Defence Force was partly responsible for the revival of the M23 by supplying military and operational support.
Uganda received permission to pave 1,182 km of roads in North Kivu, which is estimated to increase border trade between Uganda and the DRC. However, Kagame feels that the road between Rutshuru and Goma would upset the Rwandan sphere of influence in North Kivu.
This project is also linked to Operation Suhjaa, a military operation to secure the road and fight the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamist extremist group.
Besides roads, there is also a clash of regional mining interests, as Rwanda and Uganda are the main conduits for illegally smuggled gold.
The rise of the M23 is causing anti-Tutsi and Kinyarwanda sentiments. In response, President Tshisekedi urged his countrymen “not to give in to xenophobic remarks and other speeches of hatred or stigmatisation of Rwandophone communities.”
Pacifying eastern Congo was one of President Tshisekedi’s electoral promises.
To this end, he declared military action in North Kivu and Ituri in May 2021, and agreed to joint military actions with neighbouring countries.
Despite these measures, the revival of the M23 could not be stopped. East Africa tried a different approach by organising several peace talks with Congolese officials, rebel leaders, and regional partners to address grievances and negotiate disarmament conditions.
Despite the EAC’s peace-making efforts, several issues hamper lasting peace on the ground.
Firstly, the M23 was not invited to the Nairobi peace talks, as President Tshisekedi considers them a terrorist organisation and a Rwandan front.
Secondly, both the M23 and the FARDC accuse each other of not honouring ceasefires. Thirdly, the above-mentioned ethnic tensions exacerbate the violence even further. Finally, it is a short-sighted presumption that stability would return to eastern Congo if only the M23 laid down its weapons.
In any case, military responses in the past have not prevented the M23’s resurgence. Hence, a different strategy, which focuses on genuine structural reforms, local grievances, and restoring dialogue between Tshisekedi and Kagame, is needed.
IOL Africa