African nations must seize the opportunity to strengthen China-Africa relations amidst global uncertainty, say the writers.
Image: IOL
By Emmanuel Matambo and David Monyae
From January 5 to 11, 2025, China Foreign Minister Wang Yi is visiting four African countries (Namibia, the Republic of the Congo, Chad and Nigeria) continuing a 35-year-old tradition of Africa being the first destination of China’s Foreign Minister every calendar year.
Most reportage on the issue has highlighted the longevity of this tradition. While understandable, the very mundanity of the practice should shift the focus to other – more interesting – backdrops against which Wang’s visit takes place. The first is to recap the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 2024 Summit and what was decided there.
The second is the impending return of Donald Trump to the White House, after his electoral victory in November 2024. The third – somewhat connected to the second – is whether the West will become more insular than was the case with Joe Biden at the helm of the US government, and what this will do to global trade, international affairs, and Africa’s place therein.
Two things stood out from the 2024 FOCAC Summit last September in Beijing. The first was how South Africa’s president Cyril Ramaphosa, who preceded his FOCAC participation with a state visit at China’s invitation, struck a very candid note in his talks with his Chinese counterpart.
He broached the uncomfortable fact that Africa continues to run a trade deficit in its dealings with China, thereby suffering the same fate that it did with its dealings with mostly the West. While this could easily be characterised as an indictment of China, this is only part of the entire picture. Another interpretation is that Africa is increasingly asserting its agency in dealings with powerful players – like how South Africa stood its ground on the Israeli case at the International Court of Justice, all along enduring an onslaught of threats by the United States.
Secondly, Ramaphosa’s candid remarks betoken a maturity in Africa-China relations; that the relationship has reached a stage where the parties could openly discuss shortcomings in their mutual quest to improve the quality of the relationship. The era of thoughtless and formulaic platitudes, one would hope, is petering out.
The second issue that stood out during FOCAC 2024 was an ambitious three year (2025-2027) programme that China’s Xi Jinping outlined. He summarised it as “ten partnership actions for modernisation to deepen China-Africa cooperation and spearhead the Global South modernisation”.
The numbers he reeled off were impressive: China was prepared to carry out 30 infrastructural projects in Africa, 1,000 "small and beautiful" livelihood projects, he promised to work in tandem with the China-World Bank Group Partnership Facility to boost Africa's development and sending 2,000 medical personnel to Africa and launch 20 programs for health facilities and malaria treatment, among others.
Historically, the main blemish on equally impressive commitments was that there was no proper monitoring and evaluation mechanism. If the agency spoken about above is to be further entrenched, the quartet of African countries that Wang is visiting should raise this issue, and closely monitor the progress of the next three years.
By the time Wang leaves African shores on January 11, it will be nine days before Donald Trump is inaugurated as President of the United States. Shortly after reclaiming the White House, Trump was already spoiling for a trade fight with China, threatening to impose exorbitant tariffs in a recast of the showdown that he started in 2018 when he imposed 25% on Chinese industrial machinery, cars, auto parts and other imports that amounted to about $50 billion of the $540 billion America spent on imports from China that year. Trump’s intent was to bolster America’s manufacturing capacity and to rebalance what he thought was unfair trade with China (China had imported $120 billion worth of goods from the US that year).
This was in keeping with what has come to be understood as Trump’s transactional temperament which also animates his conduct in the Oval Office. On January 7, 2025, he held a press conference at his Mar-a-Lago residence, in which he reiterated a suite of tariffs that he intends to impose, and singled out Mexico and Canada as possible targets.
“We don’t need their cars,” Trump said about Canada, a country that he says should be the 51st state of the United States; for some time, he has been referring to outgoing Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as Governor Trudeau.
Trump also accused former president and recently deceased Jimmy Carter of selling the Panama Canal for $1, and that the facility was now being used by China, to America’s economic detriment. He also castigated NATO, effectively blaming it for instigating Russia’s war with Ukraine.
If Trump makes good on his rhetoric, we will see a chaotic return to insular politics in the United States, and this could mean reduced or total withdrawal of participation in international instruments such as the Paris Agreement on climate change and the UN Human Rights Council.
These eventualities are instructive for Africa-China relations; they offer an opportunity for reduced dependence on American global leadership and example, notwithstanding the fact that America will still cling to the idea of being ‘the indispensable nation’. In addition, China’s growth for the last four decades has been enabled by a globalised trade economy which is out of kilter with Trump’s economic nationalism.
Continued commitment to global supply chains, and the entrenchment of regional integration in Africa are crucial for fostering intra-African trade and economic growth. The infrastructure projects to which China has committed itself on the continent are an inescapable cog in this. During FOCAC 2024 last September, Trump had not yet been elected, but I am sure those present must have been girding for the eventuality. His pronouncements at Mar-a-Largo will be lurking in the background as Wang meets leaders of the countries he is visiting.
Trump’s return portends an insular American foreign policy, which might have an effect beyond the country’s borders. While Brazil rid itself of Jair Bolsonaro – a Trump votary – Argentina has Javier Milei who has been associated with right-wing leaders of the Americas. If Trump makes good on his tariff threats, he will not only injure Americans who depend on imports, but he would also force China into taking retaliatory measures. American allies would be thrown into a quandary, not wanting to offend a capricious American president, but at the same time be cognisant of the importance of business with China.
These calculations are likely to influence China and Africa. By sending its foreign minister to Africa as the first destination of every calendar year, China continuously reassures Africa of the high premium that it puts on its relationship with the continent. It is fair to say China has become an indispensable trade and investment partner for many African countries.
In Namibia, one of the countries on Wang’s busy itinerary, Chinese investments in Swakop Uranium and Rossing Uranium alone contribute about 7% to Namibia’s GDP, while providing thousands of employment opportunities.
In Congo-Brazzaville, the Chinese-built Number 1 National Highway shortens the distance between the strategic Pointe-Noire economic hub to the capital city Brazzaville.
The responsibility, thus, of the African countries that will be hosting Wang, is to draw attention to the uncertainty of global affairs in 2025, the importance of Africa-China relations, the call for a more mutually beneficial Africa-China tandem, and a proper tracking system that will hold China accountable for the partnership plans that Xi proclaimed.
These issues are more important than waxing lyrical about the ritualistic choice of Africa as the first calendar-year destination of the Chinese Foreign Minister.
* Emmanuel Matambo is the Research Director of the Centre for Africa-China Studies, University of Johannesburg, while David Monyae is the Director of the Centre.
** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.