President Cyril Ramaphosa’s adherence to neoliberalism stands at odds with BRICS’s multipolar vision, leaving South Africa out of step with the bloc’s most transformative goals, says the writer.
By Gillian Schutte
Under Jacob Zuma's leadership, the uMkhonto we Sizwe Party (MKP) represents South Africa’s strongest hope for sovereignty, de-dollarisation, and a meaningful role within BRICS. I make this assertion in light of the recent BRICS discussions, where Cyril Ramaphosa’s hollow rhetoric has once again emphasised his inability to steer South Africa toward true economic independence. Despite his calls for “mutual, shared and equitable prosperity,” Ramaphosa’s ambiguous language and vague promises at the summit do little to conceal an embedded commitment to appeasing Western financial interests rather than breaking free from them. His speech, filled with lofty ideals, lacks any real commitment to reducing South Africa’s dependency on Western economic systems, although, according to recent data from the World Bank, South Africa’s debt-to-GDP ratio has reached 70%, with a significant portion owed to international financial institutions
Ramaphosa’s coalition with the Democratic Alliance (DA) under the façade of a Government of National Unity (GNU) further exposes his alignment with a US-centric neoliberal agenda that ultimately undermines BRICS’s founding goals. BRICS envisions a global economy that decentralises power from Western dominance, where member countries conduct trade in local currencies, loosening the stranglehold of the dollar. Instead, Ramaphosa’s historical reliance on Western approval dilutes South Africa’s role within BRICS, reducing the country to a position of subservience rather than leadership.
On top of this the DA's recent reprimand of President Ramaphosa’s statement referring to Russia as a “valuable ally and friend” reveals the growing tension within the GNU regarding South Africa’s international alliances. The DA openly rejected any notion of alignment with Russia, labelling it as an “authoritarian regime” and warning that such alliances could undermine international relations crucial to South Africa’s economic stability. Their insistence that GNU positions align with Western perspectives is in direct opposition with BRICS’s anti-hegemonic goals of reducing dependency on Western financial institutions and forging alliances among countries in the Global South.
Though Ramaphosa isn’t entirely under the DA’s thumb, it was he who ushered the ANC into this unholy alliance. By design, the DA’s influence within the GNU constrains his ability to fully commit to BRICS-aligned policies. Advancing South Africa’s BRICS ambitions would require him to navigate away from the DA’s pro-Western stance, which favours established trade partnerships over multipolar relationships that BRICS promotes. This balancing act not only challenges his authority within the GNU but also deflects from his inability to meaningfully commit to BRICS objectives while maintaining coalition stability. It is not hard to reach the conclusion that this was his and his Stellenbosch elite network’s strategic trajectory all along.
While Ramaphosa continues his empty advocacy for BRICS to enable “inclusive growth” and challenge Western hegemony, it is his domestic actions that tell the true story. His administration has yet to take substantial steps to alleviate inequality, reduce dollar dependency, or support local currency use in trade. His reference to “inclusive growth” within BRICS reads as lip service, given the worsening poverty and unemployment in South Africa, exacerbated by austerity measures and weakened public sector capacity. For example, under the post-1994 ANC’s neoliberal governance, the removal or weakening of regulatory boards intended to stabilise food prices has had devastating consequences for South Africa’s most vulnerable populations. With minimal oversight, food prices have skyrocketed, leaving a significant portion of the population calorie- and nutrient-deprived, effectively facing starvation conditions. According to a 2023 report from the Pietermaritzburg Economic Justice and Dignity Group, the cost of a basic household food basket increased by nearly 14% over the past year, placing essential goods far out of reach for the unemployed, grant recipients, and low-income households. Another study by Statistics South Africa found that food insecurity affects over 20% of the population, with low-income urban and rural communities hardest hit as they already struggle to access nutritious food. The rollback of government oversight has left essential food items subject to market volatility, price gouging, and monopolistic control by large agribusinesses, worsening inequality and nutritional deprivation.
The video is seemingly manipulated.👆![CDATA[]]>🏾![CDATA[]]>🧐
— Monwabisi Kete 🇿![CDATA[]]>🇦 (@MonwabisiKete) October 24, 2024
The audio (President Cyril Ramaphosa's voice) is superimposed on an unrelated video or visuals in an attempt to change the audience's viewpoint and create a different narrative than reality.
Here's the actual video of the 2024 BRICS… pic.twitter.com/KoZlB656Eb
This austerity agenda has only been reinforced through (Ramaphosa’s) ANC’s coalition with the DA, as a party that is historically committed to fiscal conservatism. The DA, which prioritises reducing state spending and favours privatisation over public sector solutions, has long advocated for budget cuts to limit government debt and reduce state involvement in areas it believes the private sector can manage more efficiently. Their alliance with Ramaphosa strengthens this neoliberal approach, which has led to reduced spending on social programmes and food relief initiatives, worsening food insecurity across South Africa. This fiscal conservatism deepens the suffering of vulnerable communities, whose access to essential services is cut back while powerful corporations continue to profit.
The DA’s resistance to the National Health Insurance (NHI) mirrors the neoliberal stance that Ramaphosa’s government has increasingly aligned with, prioritising private sector interests over comprehensive, inclusive reforms. Ramaphosa’s willingness to partner with the DA in the Government of National Unity (GNU) reflects his broader hesitancy to challenge entrenched private sector privileges in both healthcare and other critical areas like energy and economic policy. In his failure to push forward with bold, redistributive policies like the NHI, Ramaphosa tacitly supports a healthcare system that perpetuates inequality, favouring wealthier South Africans while neglecting the majority, who rely on the underfunded public sector. This alignment with DA’s approach not only undermines the NHI’s transformative potential but also reinforces a broader pattern in Ramaphosa’s leadership: a reluctance to disrupt neoliberal interests, even when it means sacrificing the welfare of ordinary South Africans.
In contrast, Jacob Zuma and the MKP’s leftist developmental ideals present a more substantial path towards de-dollarisation and multipolarity. This is not to argue that Zuma was not once locked into the ANC’s neoliberal economic policies under his administration. However, he changed his stance in his later presidency which marked a significant departure from his earlier economic policies, as he embraced Radical Economic Transformation (RET) to address systemic inequality and economic dependency. RET’s redistributive policies and state control of resources aimed to loosen South Africa’s ties to dollar-based influence, aligning instead with BRICS’s broader vision for economic self-sufficiency across the Global South. This shift was not without consequence, as global financial institutions and Western governments voiced moral panic over RET’s implications for foreign investments, leading to intense scrutiny of Zuma’s administration, causing the IMF to warn South Africa in 2017 that RET policies might “destabilise foreign direct investment”.
This era saw a decisive move by Zuma, who dismissed then-Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas, both of whom had been on an economic roadshow in the UK and US aimed at reassuring foreign investors. The recall and subsequent dismissal of Gordhan and Jonas signalled a break from the investor-friendly neoliberal approach they championed, making it clear that Zuma intended to push forward with RET despite pressure from international financial institutions. Additionally, Zuma’s commitment to an independent energy policy culminated in a controversial nuclear energy deal with Russia, which envisioned South Africa securing up to 9.6 GW of nuclear power through Russian support. This nuclear deal, while heavily criticised domestically and internationally, was part of Zuma’s broader strategy to realign South Africa’s energy sector away from Western control and toward a multipolar partnership structure that would include BRICS allies.
The decision to advance Radical Economic Transformation (RET), pursue a nuclear energy deal with Russia, and dismiss key neoliberal figures sent shockwaves through South Africa’s economy, with the rand plummeting as a result. For Zuma, however, these were bold steps aimed at realigning South Africa’s economic and energy policies away from Western capital and towards a BRICS-oriented path of autonomy and redistribution. This shift towards de-dollarisation and African nationalism met with fierce opposition; Zuma faced a well-coordinated campaign to discredit his efforts, largely fuelled by U.S.-aligned financial interests intent on preserving Western economic influence. In response, Zuma engaged Bell Pottinger—not to divide, but to defend his RET stance in a media landscape increasingly hostile to his policies. This vicious liberal backlash ultimately weakened his presidency and paved the way for Ramaphosa to reposition the ANC with a pro-Western agenda, winning him the presidency along with the carefully crafted image of “Mr Clean”. The fallout from the Bell Pottinger scandal shows the immense pressures on any leader striving to break from dollar dependency, reinforcing the need for an MKP agenda that is transparent, resilient, and explicitly rooted in decolonisation, de-dollarisation and radical social justice principles.
With this ethos in place I propose that the MKP is the only party that has both the experience and the ideological will to align South Africa with the BRICS resolutions with the focus on dismantling a unipolar, dollar-dominated economy in favour of a multipolar structure where emerging economies can engage on equitable terms. With initiatives like the New Development Bank, BRICS is working to strengthen trade in local currencies and establish frameworks for cooperation outside U.S.-dominated financial systems. The recent push for trade in local currencies further illustrates BRICS’s commitment to loosening dollar dependency, with members increasingly facilitating bilateral trade in their own currencies rather than the dollar. These are the steps South Africa could lead under MKP’s stewardship, with a commitment to BRICS’s ideals of sovereignty and regional empowerment driving the nation forward. Ramaphosa’s adherence to neoliberalism, however, stands at odds with BRICS’s multipolar vision, leaving South Africa out of step with the bloc’s most transformative goals.
* Gillian Schutte is a film-maker, and a well-known social justice and race-justice activist and public intellectual.
** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.